Minnesota Supreme Court Opinions: December 10, 2025

Today’s edition of Minnesota Appellate Court Watch covers the opinions released by the Minnesota Supreme Court on December 10, 2025. This week we have two decisions. First, a statutory interpretation question formally defining the offense of attempted first-degree assault-harm. Second, an attorney discipline matter resolving a host of issues related to family law representation by transferring an attorney to disability inactive status. I’ve already dug my accursed corner lot out of last night’s snowstorm, so now let’s dig into the opinions.

This newsletter contains the sole opinions of me, Daniel Suitor. You can reach me via email at opinions[at]minnappct[dot]watch. As always, everything contained here is solely for informational purposes, and is not legal advice. If you have a legal issue, you should contact your local public defender’s office, legal aid provider, or a private attorney.

State v. Oliver

Citation: State v. Oliver, No. A23-1062 (Minn. Dec. 10, 2025).

• Criminal
• Appeal from Dakota County District Court (19HA-CR-22-2736)
• Opinion, Hennesy (Gaïtas dissenting, joined by Moore, III)

Case Statistics

• PFR Requested: 9/18/2024 (448 days from PFR request to decision)
• PFR Granted: 11/27/2024 (70 days from PFR request to grant, 378 days from PFR grant to decision)
• Argued: 3/31/2025 (124 days from PFR grant to argument, 254 days from argument to decision)

Rulings
An attempt, charged under Minn. Stat. § 609.17, to commit first-degree assault
harm, Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 1, is a valid crime under Minnesota law.

Case Summary
This case arises from a stabbing related to a custody dispute. The Defendant went to the home of her co-parent and initiated an argument which became physical. At some point, neighbors "heard a woman’s voice scream, 'I’m going to f[]ing kill you. I’m going to f[]ing stab you.'" Page 3 (alterations in original). The victim stated that the Defendant cut his neck, and a friend of the Defendant stated that the Defendant "told her that she was in a nearby field, that she had sliced [the victim]’s neck with a small knife, and that she had disposed of the knife." Page 3. The victim required stitches and had a visible scar during the trial three months after the incident (speedy trial demand).

The Defendant was initially charged with attempted second-degree intentional murder but, on the day of trial, the prosecution amended in counts of attempted first-degree assault (harm) and second degree assault with a dangerous weapon resulting in substantial bodily harm. The Defendant was acquitted on the attempted murder charge, but found guilty on both assault charges. Judgment was not entered on second-degree assault conviction as the District Court found it a lesser-included offense of the attempted first-degree conviction.

At the Court of Appeals, the Defendant's conviction was reversed. State v. Oliver, 11 N.W.3d 817 (Minn. Ct. App. 2024). The crux of the COAs ruling was that "attempted first-degree assault-harm, without a finding that the victim suffered great bodily harm, is inconsistent with the statutory scheme for assault, and the specific intent that is required for an attempted crime . . . conflicts with the general intent requirement of assault-harm." Id. at 827.

Here, the Supreme Court ruled that attempted first-degree assault (harm) is a valid criminal offense and affirmed the District Court's conviction. The Defendant argued that the inclusion of a specific attempt offense in the assault statute showed legislative intent to exempt the assault statute from the attempt statute. The Supreme Court disagreed, formulating two separate offenses as such:

• Under Attempt statute: Attempted first-degree assault (harm) = (1) the specific intent to inflict great bodily harm, and (2) taking a substantial step towards inflicting great bodily harm.
• Under Assault statute: First-degree assault (attempt) = (1) the specific intent to inflict bodily harm upon another; (2) taking a substantial
  step towards inflicting bodily harm; and (3) the infliction of great bodily harm.

Pages 13–15. The Court thus ruled that the attempt and assault statutes prohibit different conduct and constitute separate and cognizable offenses.

The Defendant also argued that attempted first-degree assault (harm) is not an offense because the required mental state for attempt and first-degree assault (harm) conflict. The Court of Appeals had relied on precedent which held it impossible to attempt second-degree negligent manslaughter, because attempt is a specific intent crime and the very underpinning of negligence is a lack of intent. Page 19. But the Supreme Court distinguished that case, ruling that while specific intent and lack of intent are incompatible, specific intent and general intent are not always incompatible. In the words of the opinion:

It is not illogical that someone could generally intend to do an act that actually causes bodily harm to another while having the specific intent to cause them great bodily harm. This is because the general intent is merely the intention to do the physical act, while the specific intent is the intent to cause the result.

Page 20.

The Supreme Court's reversal comes with a remand to the Court of Appeals. Because the COA found that attempted first-degree assault (harm) was not a cognizable offense, it did not consider the Defendant's alternative argument attacking the sufficiency of the evidence to prove her intent to inflict great bodily harm, as well as her sentencing argument. The COA must now consider those arguments.

In her dissent, Justice Gaïtas frames the case differently. She argues that the Court improperly restricted its analysis to the attempt statute, instead of viewing the attempt statute in light of the assault statute's scheme as the Defendant urged. She discusses that scheme, explaining how it "generally tie[s] the degree of the assault crime to the harm that is actually inflicted" and considers attempt cases. Pages D-5–D-6. She also points out pertinent policy issues concerning inconsistent charging and the major disparity in sentences between the same act chargeable under different offenses. Pages D-7–D-8. Justice Gaïtas goes on to point out that the recognition of attempted first-degree assault (harm) imports "an intent element that does not exist under the assault statutes and that our assault-harm case law has rebuked: a specific intent to cause a certain degree of harm." Page D-9.

The fundamental dispute between the majority and minority opinions is what frame to view the case through: the assault statute or the attempt statute. The majority says the Defendant was convicted of attempt, a distinct offense, so we evaluate the attempt statute standing alone. The minority views the statutes as more interrelated.

In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Mattey

A Note on Attorney Discipline: I must admit, I've wrestled with how to write about attorney discipline matters. On one hand, they are absolutely noteworthy and important issues to consider for the protection of the public and improvement of the profession. On the other hand, it would be very easy to stray into a gawky and gossipy conversation, which is not my goal. And who am I to sit in judgment. There are often difficult personal circumstances underlying discipline-worthy conduct. This does not excuse the violation of our ethical obligations, but neither does it excuse our moral imperative to view attorneys as whole people.

Ultimately, my goal is to try to provide context for and track trends in appellate matters, including attorney discipline. My intent is for coverage of disciplinary matters to center on the areas of focus for OLPR and the Supreme Court. If you feel I have crossed a line with my writing about an attorney discipline matter, please feel free to contact me. I welcome your feedback.

Citation: In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Mattey, No. A25-1426 (Minn. Dec. 4, 2025).

• Attorney Discipline
• Original Jurisdiction
• Opinion, Moore, III
• OLPR's Petition

Case Statistics

• Petition Requested: 9/2/2025 (93 days from petition to decision)
• Argued: No argument, order issued after joint stipulation and recommendation by OLPR and respondent and independent review of record

Case Summary
This disciplinary matter arises from allegations of attorney misconduct in four family law matters. The attorney was first barred in Minnesota in 2008, but the conduct at issue did not arise until 2022. However, OLPR did issue an admonition against the attorney in 2020 concerning similar conduct as we see here.

The four primary counts tend to involve (1) non-compliant flat-fee agreements, (2) failure to deposit client funds into a trust account, (3) failure to refund unearned fees, (4) misappropriation of client funds, (5) failure to work diligently on matters, (6) failure to respond to clients' requests for information, and (7) making knowingly false and misleading statements to clients about the representation. The fifth count details the attorney's noncooperation with the OLPR's investigations over the course of ten months.

It must be noted that the Supreme Court agreed with the attorney's argument that she is suffering from "physical incapacity" that makes her "unable to assist in her defense." I don't want to do much speculation about her individual circumstances, but I would suggest that the attorney's 12 years of practice without any disciplinary action to begin her career, and that these violations occurred in a compressed period of two years (2022 to 2024), can be read along with that finding. I have no personal knowledge of the circumstances, and I hope the attorney can get well. The Court only stayed this matter, so if the attorney seeks to move back to active status she would still face discipline for the alleged violations.

One of the dark jokes attorneys will tell about professional regulation is that so long as you show up and don't mess with the clients' money, you're 90% of the way towards keeping your license. This case is an example of why that's the case. In particular, it highlights the hazard of flat-fee agreements for attorneys. If you mess up your agreement, it's one violation for using a non-compliant flat-fee agreement, then those funds are converted to advance fees so it's another violation for failing to place them in trust, and a third violation if you spend them. In this case, the violation was that the "flat fee agreement failed to advise the client that the funds would not be placed into a trust account." Flat-fee agreements absolutely have a place in certain scenarios, as I think they can provide value for both attorneys and clients alike (I discuss this a bit on my practice's website). But even as someone who went over their own flat-fee agreement with a fine-toothed comb while writing it, the petition in this matter had me double-checking my template.

Orders on Petitions for Review

There were no PFR orders issued since last week's edition. Normally, the Court publishes a calendar of their Special Term Conferences, which is when PFRs are decided. But the file that's currently live only goes up to August. So I don't know when the next batch will be. Like so many things in life: maybe tomorrow, maybe in a few weeks.

Miscellanea

Banner image courtesy of the inestimable Tony Webster.

Out of candor to readers, my standing disclosures and conflicts are listed at the bottom of this page. I will disclose if I have worked on a case in a formal capacity, had any informal contacts with the case, or have personal connections to the case. I do this because I think transparency about my background helps readers judge my writing properly.