Minnesota Supreme Court Opinions: December 3, 2025

Today’s edition of Minnesota Appellate Court Watch covers the opinion release by the Minnesota Supreme Court on December 3, 2025. We have one opinion this week, a multifaceted criminal procedure case with a major Fourth Amendment question concerning the warrantless collection of DNA evidence.

This newsletter contains the sole opinions of me, Daniel Suitor. As always, everything contained here is solely for informational purposes, and is not legal advice. If you have a legal issue, you should contact your local public defender’s office, legal aid provider, or a private attorney.

State v. Steeprock

Citation: State v. Steeprock, No. A23-0875 (Minn. Dec. 3, 2025).

• Criminal:
• Appeal from St. Louis County District Court (69-DU-CR-21-26)
• Opinion, Gaïtas (McKeig concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Moore)
• Reversed and remanded for a new trial

Case Statistics

• PFR Requested: 8/28/2024 (462 days from PFR request to decision)
• PFR Granted: 11/19/2024 (83 days from PFR request to grant, 379 days from PFR grant to decision)
• Argued: 3/28/2025 (129 days from PFR grant to argument, 250 days from argument to decision)

Rulings

1. The warrantless collection of a buccal swab from a defendant pursuant to Rule 9.02, subdivision 2(1)(f), of the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure is an unreasonable search that violates the United States and Minnesota Constitutions.
2. The warrantless collection of a buccal swab from the defendant requires a new trial because no exception to the exclusionary rule applies and the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We overrule In re Welfare of J.W.K., 583 N.W.2d 752 (Minn. 1998), as clearly in conflict with the inevitable discovery rule articulated in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), and reiterated in State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 849 (Minn. 2011).
3. The word “testimony” in Minnesota Statutes section 634.04, which requires corroboration of accomplice testimony, means statements made under oath.

Case Summary
The case arises from convictions for attempted first-degree murder (aiding and abetting) and unlawful possession of a firearm. The State first obtained a DNA sample via buccal swab through a warrant issued in its investigation. The primary suspect challenged the basis for the warrant and the State eventually stipulated that it would not use that initial sample in Steeprock's case. The State moved for and was granted permission to collect a second DNA sample via swab under MRCP 9.02, subd. 2(1)(f). Steeprock’s DNA was found on the gun used in the shooting at issue, and this evidence was used at trial. The State also submitted jail call recordings and text messages from the primary suspect discussing the shooting and referencing Steeprock.

On appeal, Steeprock challenges the admissibility of the DNA evidence as an unconstitutional search and the admissibility of the calls and texts as uncorroborated accomplice testimony. The Court of Appeals held the DNA evidence inadmissible and ordered a new trial, but ruled the primary suspect's calls and texts admissible. Here, the Supreme Court reaches the same results.

The crux of the Supreme Court’s ruling on the DNA evidence is that MRCP 9.02 only allows the collection of evidence “subject to constitutional limitations,” and that there is just no way around the constitutional requirement of a warrant for a buccal swab for investigatory purposes. In doing so, the Court recognized the intrusiveness of the DNA collection search “may result in a greater intrusion than the physical collection procedure itself” because DNA “can provide highly sensitive genetic information, including ancestry, disease carrier status, and physical traits.” Page 16.

Beyond the search itself, the Court ruled that the inevitable-discovery and good-faith exceptions to the exclusionary rule did not apply. Regarding inevitable discovery, the Court overruled another DNA-evidence case (In re Welfare of J.W.K.) on grounds that it conflicts with the rule in State v. Diede: “The State may not show inevitable discovery by claiming that if it had not searched illegally, it would have done so legally.” Page 25. In essence, the Court holds that it’s not enough for the State to say “We could have applied for a warrant and it probably would’ve been granted, so it doesn’t matter that we didn’t.”

Regarding the good-faith exception, the Court did not decide the foundation of the issue directly on the screws. In Minnesota, the good-faith exception allows for the admission of otherwise-inadmissible evidence that was obtained in reliance on binding appellate precedent. Essentially, it prevents evidence from being bounced when case law shifts under an investigation’s feet. Here, the State argued that MRCP 9.02 is the equivalent of binding precedent, but the Count only assumed that ad arguendo in pointing out that the Rule is still “subject to constitutional limitations.” Page 28.

As a result, the Court ultimately ruled that the error necessitated a new trial, reversing and remanding.

Finally, the Court ruled that the admission of the DNA evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, pointing to the strength of the evidence and the State’s repeated reliance on it. Page 30.

The Court’s analysis on the admission of the primary suspect’s jailhouse communications comes down to statutory analysis of the word “testimony” in Minn. Stat. ch. 634 (laws governing certain evidence). Unsurprisingly, the Court hewed to a narrow interpretation that “testimony” under Ch. 634 is restricted “only to statements made under oath.” Page 34. Therefore, it was not an error for the trial court to decline to give an uncorroborated accomplice testimony instruction to the jury.

The minority opinion concurs with the analysis of the jailhouse communications issue, but dissents from the DNA sample issue. Ultimately, the minority’s position relies on the fact that it would not have overturned In re Welfare of J.W.K. and that the history of a warrant for a buccal swab in this case shows that the State would have ultimately obtained a legal warrant. Page C/D-3. The minority opinion relies on stare decisis and finds “no compelling reason to overrule our precedent in J.W.K”. Page C/D-4. Of note, the writer of the minority opinion stated in an interview just one year ago that she “was inspired by” the Justice who wrote J.W.K, and that Justice is listed as an “Honorary Campaign Committee Member” on the writer’s campaign website. I do not suggest that personal affinity or allegiences are the reason for the minority's position. I am confident that the minority comes by its opinion through honest and earnest intellectual analysis. But the lineage of legal philosphies is an interesting phenomenon to track.

Orders on Petitions for Review

Average PFR decision time for 11/26 orders: 49.5 days

• Grants: 52 days
• Denials: 49 days
  
  
• Civil: 48 days
• Criminal: 51 days
• Certiorari: 42 days

Grants
Moline Machinery, LLC vs. City of Duluth, No. A25-0205, Civil, Appeal from St. Louis County District Court (69DU-CV-21-1668), 49 days from PFR request to decision

Issues Granted

• City of Duluth: When municipal utility customers challenge the utility’s ratemaking, when Minnesota ratemaking law forbids an order of refunds absent express legislative authority, and when there is no legislative authority for refunds of the utility fees, can a court order refunds under a theory of unjust enrichment?

• Moline Machinery, LLC: Whether a court, evaluating a municipality’s motion for summary judgment on an unjust enrichment claim challenging user fees charged by the municipality for providing the plaintiff municipal services, may (1) defer to the municipality and presume that the fees are just and reasonable, and (2) require the plaintiff to produce evidence that a reasonable fact- finder could conclude clearly and convincingly rebuts the presumption of just and reasonable rate-design decisions—despite the summary judgment standard requiring that courts view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and resolve any doubts as to the existence of a material fact dispute in the nonmovant’s favor, and despite this Court’s repeated admonishments against restricting the broad scope of the equitable unjust enrichment remedy.

(Stayed) Minnesota Teamsters Service Bureau vs. GoodRx, Inc., No. A24-2031, Civil, Appeal from Hennepin County District Court (27-CV-24-9554), 55 days from PFR request to decision

Stayed Pending Final Disposition in Warren v. ACOVA, Inc., No. A24-0450.

Issues Granted
When a plaintiff alleges it has not been and will not be affected in any way by allegedly unlawful conduct, does the plaintiff have a sufficient stake in a justiciable controversy to seek relief from the court?

Denials

• Ward vs. Ward Family, Inc., No. A25-0016, Civil, Appeal from Stearns County District Court (73-CV-23-434), 65 days from PFR request to decision
• Lepoutre vs. City of North Oaks, No. A25-0482, Civil: Land Use/Environmental, Appeal from Ramsey County District Court (62-CV-22-5473), 49 days from PFR request to decision
• Link vs. Hidde, No. A25-0466, Civil: Personal Injury, Appeal from Itasca County District Court (31-CV-23-2435), 55 days from PFR request to decision
• In re Burnet, No. A25-1307, Writ: Prohibition, Appeal from Hennepin County District Court (27-CV-22-15378), 49 days from PFR request to decision
• In re Civil Commitment of Moore, No. A25-1323, Civil: Civil Committment, Appeal from Ramsey County District Court (62-MH-PR-25-269), 54 days from PFR request to decision
• Rued, also o/b/o W.O.R. v. Webber, No. A25-0362, Civil: Protective Order, Appeal from Scott County District Court (70-CV-24-7810), 10 days from PFR request to decision
• Bellicot ex rel. Bellicot v. Bonnie P. Fines, MD, No. A25-0044, Civil: Med Mal, Appeal from Stearns County District Court (73-CV-20-4532), 42 days from PFR request to decision
• Ouk vs. Schnell, No. A25-0169, Criminal: Habeas, Appeal from Carlton County District Court (09-CV-24-957), 41 days from PFR request to decision
• Hogendorf v. Green, No. A24-1981, Civil: Land Use/Environmental, Appeal from Anoka County District Court (02-CV-22-678), 42 days from PFR request to decision
• Moore v. Commissioner of Public Safety, No. A24-1896, Civil: Implied Consent, Appeal from Morrison County District Court (49-CV-24-1067 ), 63 days from PFR request to decision
• State v. Abdi, No. A24-1629, Criminal, Appeal from Clay County District Court (14-CR-21-964), 55 days from PFR request to decision
• State v. Barre, No. A24-1799, Criminal, Appeal from Hennepin County District Court (27-CR-22-18485), 42 days from PFR request to decision
• State v. Iron Thunder, No. A24-1493, Criminal, Appeal from Ramsey County District Court (62-CR-22-4281), 54 days from PFR request to decision
• State v. Szathmary, No. A24-1176, Criminal, Appeal from Carlton County District Court (09-CR-23-1347 ), 42 days from PFR request to decision
• State v. Sledge, No. A24-1353, Criminal, Appeal from Hennepin County District Court (27-CR-18-21919), 49 days from PFR request to decision
• State v. Frye, No. A24-0710, Criminal, Appeal from Ramsey County District Court (62-CR-21-1641), 55 days from PFR request to decision
• State v. Brown, No. A24-1491, Criminal, Appeal from Hennepin County District Court (27-CR-23-10460), 49 days from PFR request to decision
• State v. Dotson, No. A24-0783, Criminal, Appeal from Hennepin County District Court (27-CR-23-14297 ), 49 days from PFR request to decision
• State v. Derby, No. A24-1952, Criminal, Appeal from Pipestone County District Court (59-CR-22-202), 55 days from PFR request to decision
• State v. Isack, No. A24-1871, Criminal, Appeal from Dakota County District Court (19HA-CR-22-1128), 55 days from PFR request to decision
• State v. Heggs, No. A23-1800, Criminal, Appeal from Mower County District Court (50-CR-23-687), 56 days from PFR request to decision
• State v. Weeks, No. A24-1645, Criminal, Appeal from Hennepin County District Court (27-CR-23-12175), 54 days from PFR request to decision
• State v. Ambuehl, No. A24-1675, Criminal, Appeal from Becker County District Court (03-CR-24-367 ), 57 days from PFR request to decision
• McDonald v. Monarch Bus Service, Department of Employment and Economic Development, No. A24-1939, Certiorari: Unemployment, Writ of certiorari from DEED (50866093-3), 42 days from PFR request to decision